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After nearly six years of record economic growth, the Venezuelan economy went into recession in 
the first quarter of 2009, shrinking by 3.3 percent that year. A number of analysts see this as the end 
of an “oil boom” and the beginning of a long period of recession and stagnation. 
 
For example, in June, Morgan Stanley drastically cut its forecast for GDP growth in Venezuela to 
negative 6.2 percent in 2010 and negative 1.2 percent for 2011. And the IMF projects that the 
Venezuelan  economy  will  contract  by  2.6  percent  for  2010  and  grow  by less than 1.4 percent 
annually over the next five years
1 – i.e. negative per capita GDP growth.  
 
However, the most prominent forecasts for the Venezuelan economy have been wrong in the past, 
often  by  enormous  margins.  This  was  especially  true  for  Venezuela’s  most  recent  economic 
expansion, where the IMF underestimated Venezuela’s growth for the four consecutive years 2004, 
2005, 2006, and 2007, by 10.6, 6.8, 5.4, and 4.7 percentage points, respectively. 
 
This update looks at the most recent data on the Venezuelan economy, in an attempt to evaluate its 
prospects in the foreseeable future. 
 
We find that the Venezuelan economy is most likely already in recovery, and that the 2009 recession 
has  probably  ended.  This  is  based  on  seasonally  adjusted  quarterly  data,  which  show  that  the 
Venezuelan  economy  grew  by  an  estimated  5.2  percent  in  the  second  quarter  of  2010,  on  an 
annualized basis. 
 
If the Venezuelan economy is indeed recovering, the question remains whether this recovery will 
accelerate and be sustainable. It appears that this will depend primarily on government policy. 
 
A number of analysts have argued that the Venezuelan economy will remain mired in recession or 
stagnation, and/or is doomed to long term decline. In this paper, we consider these possibilities and 
arguments. 
 
One possibility is that the government has created an unfavorable investment climate, and that this 
will severely limit the country’s growth and development. Private capital formation as a percentage 
of GDP had declined significantly, even before the 2009 recession. The question is whether this 
necessarily means that the Venezuelan economy, which grew very rapidly in the last expansion from 
2003-2008, is likely to face significant constraints on its future growth due to negative investor 
sentiment.  
 
The answer to this question is, most likely, no. As can be seen in Figure 3, private capital formation 
rebounded very rapidly as the economic recovery began in 2003, despite intense hostility toward the 
government on the part of the most powerful business interests This indicates that many domestic 
investors, when there are profitable opportunities to invest within the country, will take advantage of 
them.  
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The government can also compensate for the current fall-off in private investment by increasing 
public investment. This was done successfully in 2008, as can be seen in Figure 3.  As the recent 
electricity crisis has shown, Venezuela has a great need for public investment in infrastructure. The 
government can also invest in residential construction, transportation, hospitals, and other public 
needs. All of this can compensate for weak private investment, as necessary. And as can be seen in 
Table 2, private consumption follows the growth of the economy. Eventually, if it becomes clear 
that  the  government  is  committed  to  maintaining  economic  growth,  we  would  expect  private 
investment to increase, as it did from 2003-2006.  
 
The government can increase and maintain economic growth so long as it does not face a foreign 
exchange crisis. It is important to understand that this is the binding constraint on countries that do 
not have “hard” currencies (as compared to the U.S., which can pay for its imports in dollars).  
 
Venezuela is not in danger of a foreign exchange crisis. Its official reserves at the Central Bank are 
currently at US$28 billion. This is a reasonably high level of reserves, however: approximately half of 
imports for 2008 and over two-thirds for the reduced imports of 2009. (The most widely used 
benchmark is that international reserves should be sufficient to cover three months of imports.)
2  
 
Over the past year,
3 Venezuela’s current account surplus was US$19.8 billion, or about 6.3 percent 
of GDP, which is sizeable. 
 
Furthermore, in the case of a collapse of oil prices, the government has considerable borrowing 
capacity. This was demonstrated in April with a $20 billion credit from China.
4  Venezuela’s total 
central government public debt is just 18.4 percent of GDP; and its foreign public debt is 10.8 
percent of GDP.
5 Even if we add in the debt of PDVSA, the state-owned oil company – about 6 
percent  of  GDP  –  this  is  a  low  foreign  and  domestic  public  debt  burden,  which  gives  the 
government plenty of room to borrow if there are unforeseen external shocks. 
 
Venezuela’s inflation rate is another often mentioned problem, which is generally reported as “the 
highest in Latin America.”  Figure 3 shows monthly year-over-year inflation at 30.9 percent. This is 
high inflation, although there are no signs that it is accelerating: inflation over the last three months 
is  running at an annualized rate of 26 percent, and core inflation has been declining since last 
September. So long as it does not accelerate, Venezuela’s inflation is not by itself necessarily a 
significant impediment to future economic growth, and can be lowered gradually.
6 It is also worth 
emphasizing that the predicted surge in inflation following the devaluation did not happen – sources 
quoted by the media were in the range of 40-60 percent annual inflation for this year.
7  In fact, the 
26 percent inflation over the last three months is lower than inflation for the three months prior to 
the January devaluation. 
 
The main impact of inflation has been an indirect effect, through its influence on the real exchange 
rate. The nominal exchange rate was fixed at 2.15 from March 2005 until January of 2010. With the 
exchange rate fixed and inflation averaging about 20 percent annually over the last seven years, the 
                                                 
2 See Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001) for a review of the literature on the adequacy of reserves. 
3 This Q1 2009 to Q1 2010. 
4 Molinski and Lyons 2010. 
5 Oficinal Nacional de Crédito Público 2010. 
6 See Weisbrot, Ray and Sandoval (2009, p. 19) for more on inflation. 
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bolivar appreciated rapidly in real terms.
8 This has made imports increasingly cheap and non-oil 
exports increasingly expensive, in real terms. During the expansion, manufacturing basically held its 
own at about 16 percent of GDP; the fastest growing sectors were non-tradables such as finance 
and insurance, communications, and construction.
9  
 
The devaluations have reversed a good part of the real appreciation of the currency over the last 5 
years, but not all of it. If Venezuela wants to diversify its economy away from oil – which it has not 
done over the last decade – it will most likely need a more competitive exchange rate. 
 
Nonetheless, for the narrow question at hand here – whether the Venezuelan economy can resume 
and sustain strong economic growth – the exchange rate is unlikely to be determinative. It will affect 
the  sectoral  mix  of  economic  growth,  tilting  it  toward  non-tradables  as  during  the  previous 
expansion. But the pace of economic growth is more likely to be determined by the government’s 
other macroeconomic policies, most importantly public spending. 
 
But because of Venezuela’s position as an oil exporter – and one sitting on 500 billion barrels of oil, 
perhaps  the  largest  reserves  in  the  world  –  it  is  very  unlikely  to  run  into  foreign  exchange 
constraints. Therefore its growth, especially in the near future, will depend overwhelmingly on the 
government’s commitment to maintaining adequate levels of aggregate demand. (In that respect, its 
immediate situation is similar to that of the United States, the Eurozone economies, and many other 
economies whose recovery is currently weak and uncertain.)  
 
The prior economic expansion was an important one for Venezuela. Poverty was reduced by 47 
percent and extreme poverty by 70 percent. Real social spending per person tripled, and there were 
greatly expanded public programs in health care and education; unemployment fell by half and there 
were large gains in employment.
10 According to a recent report by the UN Economic Commission 
on Latin America, Venezuela had the sharpest reduction in inequality in the Americas during this 
expansion. The fall in the Gini coefficient from 50.0 to 41.2 from 2002-2008 gave Venezuela the 
least unequal distribution of income in Latin America.
11 
 
If the government maintains adequate levels of aggregate demand – including a commitment to 
strong counter-cyclical policies as necessary – the Venezuelan economy will grow, and the progress 
in employment, living standards, poverty reduction, and income equality that were seen during the 
previous expansion will continue. Of course this is not guaranteed – it depends on whether the 
government is willing to make, and maintain, this commitment to growth. The government will also 
have to make sure that sufficient foreign exchange is made available for imports that are inputs to 
production. If these commitments are met, then economic growth, as well as the accompanying 
social progress, can continue for years, regardless of inefficiencies, development strategies (or lack 
thereof), or other economic problems. Although there are a number of analysts who are predicting 
that the Venezuelan economy is on the verge of inevitable (and long-anticipated) ruin, there is 
nothing in the recent data – or that of the last decade – to indicate that this is true. 
 
 
                                                 
8 See Weisbrot, Ray and Sandoval. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Weisbrot, Ray and Sandoval 2009. 





After nearly six years of record economic growth, the Venezuelan economy went into recession in 
the first quarter of 2009, shrinking by 3.3 percent that year. A number of analysts see this as the end 
of an “oil boom” and the beginning of a long period of recession and stagnation. The IMF projects 
that the Venezuelan economy will contract by 2.6 percent for 2010 and grow by less than 1.4 
percent annually over the next five years
12 – i.e. negative per capita GDP growth. In March, the 
Economist Intelligence Unit forecast a 5.6 percent contraction for this year,
13 and in May, projected 
a  10  year  average  GDP  growth  rate  of  just  2.2  percent  annually.  According  to  the  EIU,  the 
Venezuelan economy “is set to stagnate further in the long term, sliding to become one of the 
weakest performers among emerging-market economies over the next two decades.”
14 There are 
many press reports with similarly negative prognoses.
15 However, as noted below, most forecasts for 
the Venezuelan economy have been far off the mark during the last seven years. 
 
This update looks at the most recent data on the Venezuelan economy, in an attempt to evaluate its 
prospects in the foreseeable future. 
 
Economic Growth, Recession, and Recovery 
 
As can be seen in Figure 1, the Venezuelan economy grew very rapidly from the first quarter of 
2003, after the oil strike that had caused a severe recession came to an end. This expansion lasted for 
nearly  six  years,  producing  cumulative  record  economic  growth  for  the  country,  with  GDP 
expanding by 95 percent from trough (Q1 2003) to peak (Q4 2008). During this expansion, poverty 
was reduced by 47 percent and extreme poverty by 70 percent (see Table 3). Real social spending per 
person  tripled,  and  there  were  greatly  expanded public programs in health care and education; 
unemployment fell by half and there were large gains in employment.
16 It is also worth noting that, 
according the UN Economic Commission on Latin America, Venezuela had the sharpest reduction 
in inequality in the Americas during this expansion. The fall in the Gini coefficient from 50.0 to 41.2 
from 2002-2008 gave Venezuela the least unequal distribution of income in Latin America.
17 
 
Table 1 shows annual data for the Venezuelan economy since 2002; Table 2 shows quarterly data 
(seasonally adjusted) since 2007. In both tables it can be seen that the economy slowed significantly 
in 2008; and Table 2 shows that growth was negative for each quarter of 2009. For 2010, the first 
quarter came in at negative 2.0 percent at an annualized rate, and second quarter growth is positive 
5.2 percent. Thus the recession appears to be over.  
 
This point is important because it has not yet been recognized that the Venezuelan economy is very 
likely in recovery. As noted above, the projections and media reports are generally very pessimistic.  
One technical reason for this could be the use by many sources of year-over-year data, which is not 
as good an indicator for whether the economy is recovering, as is the change in GDP from one 
                                                 
12 International Monetary Fund 1999 – 2010.  
13 Economist Intelligence Unit 2010b. 
14 Economist Intelligence Unit 2010c. 
15 See for example Cancel 2010, Dobson 2010, and Economist Intelligence Unit 2010a. 
16 Weisbrot, Ray and Sandoval 2009. 
17 United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 2010, Chapter 2. CEPR  Update on the Venezuelan Economy  ￿ 5 
 
 
quarter to the next. Thus, second quarter 2010 GDP, seasonally adjusted, is up 5.2 percent over the 
first quarter of 2010 at an annualized rate; whereas compared to second quarter of 2009 it is down 
1.9 percent. The story is similar for the first quarter of 2010: it is down 2.0 percent of GDP, 
seasonally adjusted, from the previous quarter, but down 5.2 percent of GDP as compared with the 
















































Source: Banco Central de Venezuela 2010, Table 5.2.4; authors’ calculations. 
Note: See footnote 19 for seasonal adjustment methodology. 
 
 
As noted above, the quarterly numbers in this paper are seasonally adjusted. The data from the 
Central Bank of Venezuela, for the first two quarters of 2010, are not seasonally adjusted; this may 
have  contributed  to  the  slowness  of  most  analysts  to  recognize  the  likely  economic  recovery 
underway in Venezuela. Without seasonally adjusted data, it is impossible to measure quarter-on-
quarter growth, since there is a strong seasonal component to the variation in quarterly GDP data.
18 
We therefore performed a seasonal adjustment, using standard methodology,
19 which yielded the 
data cited above, and shown in Figure 1 and Table 2. 
 
                                                 
18 For year-over-year quarterly comparisons, seasonal adjustments are not necessary, since the comparison is between 
the same quarter of different years. 
19 Data were seasonally adjusted using the United States Census Bureau’s X-12 Arima program.  Over the 1997-2009 
period, the mean difference between quarterly data seasonally adjusted by Banco Central de Venezuela and data 
seasonally adjusted through the X-12 Arima program was 0.009%, which is not significantly different from zero, 
statistically. The various  components of GDP shown in Table 2 were adjusted separately and added to get the 




Venezuela: Real Sector, 1998-2010 (real annual percent change) 
      1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010
a 
Real GDP, total  0.3%  -6.0%  3.7%  3.4%  -8.9%  -7.8%  18.3%  10.3%  9.9%  8.2%  4.8%  -3.3%  -3.5% 
   Public  -2.1  -5.2  3.0  -0.6  -11.1  -1.3  12.5  2.8  2.7  7.4  16.3  0.9  -2.1 
   Private  1.1  -6.9  4.2  4.9  -5.8  -8.9  17.2  12.9  11.3  7.5  -0.1  -4.5  -3.7 
                                           
By Economic Activity                                       
Oil Sector  0.3%  -3.8%  2.3%  -0.9%  -14.2%  -1.9%  13.7%  -1.5%  -2.0%  -4.2%  2.5%  -7.2%  -3.4% 
                                           
Non-Oil Sector  -0.1%  -6.9%  4.2%  4.0%  -6.0%  -7.4%  16.1%  12.2%  10.9%  9.6%  5.1%  -2.0%  -3.1% 
   Mining  -7.5  -12.1  15.3  2.8  4.3  -4.4  14.2  3.0  7.2  1.5  -4.2  -11.2  -15.2 
   Manufacturing  -1.4  -10.1  5.1  3.7  -13.1  -6.8  21.4  11.1  8.3  7.4  1.4  -6.4  -6.4 
   Electricity and Water Supply  0.5  -2.2  4.7  4.8  2.1  -0.5  8.5  11.2  4.9  -1.5  5.7  4.2  -5.6 
   Construction  1.4  -17.4  4.0  13.5  -8.4  -39.5  25.1  20.0  30.6  15.5  3.7  0.2  -6.5 
   Trade and Repair Services  -1.5  -5.4  5.7  4.6  -13.6  -9.6  28.6  21.0  15.7  16.7  4.6  -8.3  -9.0 
   Transport and Storage  -5.2  -15.3  12.5  -1.3  -10.4  -8.0  24.6  14.7  14.3  13.3  3.8  -8.5  -8.1 
   Communications  8.2  3.6  2.1  8.1  2.5  -5.0  12.9  22.4  23.5  19.8  18.2  9.8  8.1 
   Financial and Insurance  0.2  -15.2  -0.7  2.8  -14.5  11.9  37.9  36.4  47.2  16.4  -4.6  -2.4  -8.7 
   Real Estate    0.7  -4.7  0.8  3.5  -0.7  -6.0  11.1  7.9  8.6  5.8  2.7  -2.0  -2.7 
   Community and Personal Services 
and Non-Profit  0.3  -1.7  0.9  2.1  0.1  -0.3  9.4  8.2  16.5  10.9  9.5  3.1  1.1 
   General Government Services  -0.6  -4.8  2.8  2.5  -0.4  4.9  11.1  8.0  3.0  5.7  5.3  2.4  1.5 
   Other 
b  3.0  0.5  5.2  1.8  -1.0  -2.9  7.2  12.6  3.7  5.0  5.6  -0.3  -1.2 
                                           
Expenditure-Based                                       
   Government Final Consumption  -3.1%  -7.5%  4.2%  6.9%  -2.5%  5.7%  14.2%  10.7%  9.6%  6.1%  6.7%  2.3%  1.7% 
   Private Final Consumption  1.8  -1.7  4.7  6.0  -7.1  -4.3  15.4  15.7  15.5  18.7  7.1  -3.2  -4.0 
   Gross Fixed Capital Formation  5.5  -15.6  2.6  13.8  -18.3  -37.0  49.7  38.4  29.3  25.3  -3.3  -8.2  -11.9 
   Exports of Goods and Services  3.5  -11.0  5.8  -3.5  -4.0  -10.4  13.7  3.8  -3.0  -7.9  -2.7  -12.9  -13.5 
   Imports of Goods and Services  11.3  -9.3  12.4  14.1  -25.2  -20.9  57.7  35.2  34.8  29.9  3.8  -19.6  -21.6 
Source: Banco Central de Venezuela 2010, Tables 5.2.1, 5.2.7, 5.2.4. 
Notes:  
a. 2010 data is for the first half of 2010 compared to the first half of 2009. 




Venezuela: Growth, Real Sector (real annualized quarterly growth rates, seasonally adjusted data
a) 
   2007    2008    2009    2010 
  1  2  3  4    1  2  3  4    1  2  3  4    1  2 
Real GDP, total  4.7%  3.8%  15.4%  3.8%  -0.1%  9.1%  2.8%  1.4%  -8.1%  -5.4%  -6.9%  -4.2%  -2.0%  5.2% 
                                
By Economic Activity                             
Oil Sector  -2.2%  -1.9%  -3.6%  7.0%  6.3%  -1.9%  7.1%  -4.8%  -17.9%  1.4%  -15.8%  -8.0%  5.3%  12.5% 
                              
Non-Oil Sector  10.2%  3.7%  13.8%  3.8%  0.1%  14.5%  -0.8%  1.2%  -4.9%  -4.8%  -4.7%  -2.4%  -4.8%  4.6% 
   Mining  -9.3  1.9  8.2  8.6  -21.3  13.3  6.0  -47.9  7.6  7.7  -27.9  -1.6  -11.2  -32.1 
   Manufacturing  9.1  5.7  11.1  -1.3  -8.2  19.3  -8.0  -1.8  -8.5  -14.7  -11.5  7.1  -13.0  4.2 
   Electricity and Water Supply  -5.7  -13.2  0.7  -3.3  16.8  18.7  3.1  -10.1  8.0  16.2  1.9  -3.5  -17.7  -14.5 
   Construction  28.1  -1.9  9.0  17.9  -15.9  30.5  -10.8  8.1  -6.4  9.8  -4.0  -14.5  -7.8  -1.7 
   Trade and Repair Services  14.7  -1.4  39.4  -6.7  -0.7  7.1  7.3  1.0  -11.3  -20.2  -13.4  -10.3  -2.8  3.4 
   Transport and Storage  8.2  -2.8  35.6  -9.0  4.10  0.5  5.4  6.1  -6.3  -23.2  -18.2  -16.6  4.0  25.6 
   Communications  15.7  17.2  13.7  26.6  21.3  41.8  -20.6  18.3  12.6  21.5  -2.2  11.3  10.7  6.1 
   Financial and Insurance  29.2  0.8  2.3  -21.0  -4.7  -4.3  12.5  -2.9  -6.6  -3.2  -1.6  -7.5  -24.6  5.9 
   Real Estate  7.7  -0.9  9.6  -3.7  4.9  5.1  4.3  0.2  -7.4  -5.1  -0.1  -2.8  -6.1  6.9 
  
Community and Personal 
Services and Non-Profit  7.9  4.9  9.2  20.5  1.1  9.4  18.2  -4.3  0.1  4.4  2.8  -2.3  0.0  1.7 
  
General Government 
Services  7.9  5.4  9.0  6.3  6.9  1.7  3.7  4.1  -0.8  3.8  3.8  2.5  -6.1  9.7 
   Other 
b  -2.1  22.0  3.1  3.6  3.1  8.3  7.6  2.8  -9.0  3.5  1.0  -6.2  -1.5  3.1 
                                
Expenditure-Based                             
  Government Final Consumption  -4.0%  4.5%  8.8%  14.2%  3.4%  2.6%  3.0%  19.2%  -12.2%  1.6%  3.7%  18.1%  -16.7%  8.5% 
  Private Final Consumption  22.5  18.6  21.6  6.0  -0.5  8.5  7.7  2.5  -9.0  -9.3  -2.5  -6.5  -3.3  3.7 
  Gross Fixed Capital Formation  35.8  5.8  25.4  0.0  -42.7  28.1  11.5  26.5  -15.6  -30.0  -25.8  -17.8  1.7  48.0 
  Exports of Goods and Services  -10.6  0.5  -12.2  -6.8  12.9  -0.4  6.1  -44.6  -20.8  33.2  -13.5  -15.6  -22.4  -26.2 
  Imports of Goods and Services  8.6  1.6  57.5  -1.3  -6.4  -9.9  3.7  33.6  -9.1  -47.0  -52.2  -42.0  17.7  131.1 
Source: Banco Central de Venezuela 2010, Tables 5.2.1, 5.2.7, 5.2.4. 
Notes:  
a. Data were seasonally adjusted using the U.S. Census Bureau’s X-12 Arima program. See footnote 7 for more information on the method used here. 
b. Includes private agriculture, restaurants and private hotels and various public sector activities. CEPR  Update on the Venezuelan Economy  ￿ 8 
 
 
Looking at the most recent data by sector, it can be seen that manufacturing, which has been in 
decline for seven of the last eight quarters, grew by 4.2 percent. Manufacturing is about 15 percent 
of the Venezuelan economy, and has been hard hit recently by electricity shortages; water and 
electricity supply continued their sharp decline in the second quarter, at -14.5 percent. As this crisis 
has now passed, we would expect that a recovery of electricity supply would contribute to a stronger 
overall recovery in the quarters ahead.  
 
The change in exchange rate regulation also depressed growth in the second quarter, by causing 
considerable disruption due to lack of availability of foreign exchange. The new currency market, 
regulated  by  the  Central  Bank,  went  into  effect  in  June.  The  increased  availability  of  foreign 
exchange, relative to the second quarter, is also likely to boost growth in the quarters ahead, so long 
as it is maintained. 
 
Another positive sign is the recovery of gross fixed capital formation, which had collapsed during 
2009. For the first two quarters of 2010, it is up by 1.7 and 48.0 percent, respectively.  
 
To be sure, any conclusion drawn from just one or two quarters of data is necessarily tentative, and 
especially with so much depending on the second quarter. Moreover, the near future will depend 
enormously on what the government does. Nonetheless, the data indicate that it is more likely that 
not than an economic recovery is already under way, and that the recession is probably over. 
 
FIGURE 2 


























Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2010. 
 
The Downturn 
The slowdown in Venezuela began in the first quarter of 2008, about the same time as the U.S. 
recession. Private sector growth for the year was nearly flat (Table 1). Manufacturing was already 
declining by the fourth quarter of 2007, as was private capital formation (Figure 3, below).  During CEPR  Update on the Venezuelan Economy  ￿ 9 
 
 
2008, it was the 16.3 percent annual growth of the public sector (Table 1) that kept the economy 
growing, at a 4.8 percent annual rate. 
 
The biggest shock to the economy in 2008 was of course the collapse in world oil prices, which 
dropped suddenly by 50 percent in the fourth quarter of that year, and by another 21 percent in the 
first quarter of 2009. Coming on top of a slowdown in private spending that had already begun, this 
pushed the economy into recession. Added to this was a sharp slowdown in the public sector, which 
grew by only 0.9 percent in 2009 as compared to 16.3 percent the previous year. We do not have 
budget figures for 2009, but presumably public spending also decelerated significantly during this 
time, as indicated by the rapid deceleration of the growth of the public sector and by the sharp fall in 
public capital formation, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
TABLE 3 
Venezuela: Poverty and Unemployment Rates, 1997 – 2009 
Households (% of total declared)    Population (% of total declared) 
Year  Time  
Period  Poor  Extremely Poor    Poor  Extremely Poor 
1st Half  55.6  25.5    60.9  29.5   
1997 
2nd Half  48.1  19.3    54.5  23.4   
1st Half  49.0  21.0    55.4  24.7   
1998 
2nd Half  43.9  17.1    50.4  20.3   
1st Half  42.8  16.6    50.0  19.9   
1999 
2nd Half  42.0  16.9    48.7  20.1   
1st Half  41.6  16.7    48.3  19.5   
2000 
2nd Half  40.4  14.9    46.3  18.0   
1st Half  39.1  14.2    45.5  17.4   
2001 
2nd Half  39.0  14.0    45.4  16.9   
1st Half  41.5  16.6    48.1  20.1   
2002 
2nd Half  48.6  21.0    55.4  25.0   
1st Half  54.0  25.1    61.0  30.2   
2003 
2nd Half  55.1  25.0    62.1  29.8   
1st Half  53.1  23.5    60.2  28.1   
2004 
2nd Half  47.0  18.6    53.9  22.5   
1st Half  42.4  17.0    48.8  20.3   
2005 
2nd Half  37.9  15.3    43.7  17.8   
1st Half  33.9  10.6    39.7  12.9   
2006 
2nd Half  30.6  9.1    36.3  11.1   
1st Half  27.5  7.6    33.1  9.4   
2007 
2nd Half  28.5  7.9    33.6  9.6   
1st Half  27.7  7.5    33.1  9.2   
2008 
2nd Half  27.5  7.6    32.6  9.2   
1st Half  26.4  7.0    31.7  8.9   
2009 
2nd Half  23.8  5.9    29.0  7.4   
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2010. 
 
On the positive side, the recession did not have a severe effect on social indicators. As shown in 
Table 3, the poverty and extreme poverty rates continued their six-year decline, from 32.6 and 9.2 
percent, respectively, in the second half of 2008 to 29.0 and 7.4 percent, respectively, in the second CEPR  Update on the Venezuelan Economy  ￿ 10 
 
 
half of 2009. Unemployment rose during the recession, but not that sharply, from 6.8 percent at 




Figure 3 shows gross fixed capital formation in constant (1997) bolivares fuertes since 1998, public 
and private. As shown, private capital formation falls sharply (by 71 percent) during the political 
instability from 2001 to early 2003, when the last oil strike ended. It recovered rapidly to near its pre-
recession peak over the next two years. It then becomes more volatile, before going into decline at 
the end of 2007. However, as a percentage of GDP, it never recovers its pre-recession peak, and by 
2009 it is about 10 percent of GDP, as compared to 16 percent in 1999.  
 
Public capital formation follows a similar crash through the oil strike/recession, and recovery; but it 
continues to grow to about 24 percent of GDP in 2008. It then falls sharply during the recession of 
2009. At the end of 2009, combined public and private gross fixed capital formation totaled 28 
percent of GDP, as compared to 25 percent in 1999.  
 
It is worth noting that the rate of capital formation in Venezuela is relatively high as compared to 
other countries in Latin America. In Brazil, for example, it has averaged about 16.6 percent of GDP 




















































Source: Banco Central de Venezuela 2010, Table 7.1.2. 
 
                                                 
20   Seasonally adjusted. 
21 Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada 2010, IMF 1999-2010, and authors’ calculations. CEPR  Update on the Venezuelan Economy  ￿ 11 
 
 
Projections for the Venezuelan Economy 
 
Before turning to the future prospects of the Venezuelan economy, it is worth looking briefly at 
forecasts for the Venezuelan economy over the last decade.  
 
Prior Projections  
Table 4 shows the forecast for Venezuela’s GDP growth made in the fall of the prior year, in the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. 
 
As can be seen, the first two huge errors occur in the Fall of 2001 and 2002, in the IMF’s projections 
for the years 2002 and 2003, respectively. However, the Fund cannot be blamed for these errors: 
these huge, unanticipated declines in GDP were a result of an opposition oil strike from December 
2002- February 2003. Since the Fall WEO projections for both years were published before the 
strike, it is understandable that these projections were far off the mark. 
 
However, the strike ended in February of 2003, and there was no sign of a possible repeat by the fall 
of that year. Nonetheless, the Fund’s projections for the next four consecutive years underestimate 
Venezuela’s  GDP  growth  by  10.6,  6.8,  5.4,  and  4.7  percentage  points,  respectively.  These  are 
enormous errors by any standard, and especially difficult to explain because they are so large for four 
consecutive years.  Only when growth fell sharply in 2008 did the IMF (Fall 2007 forecast) come 
anywhere near close to forecasting the actual growth rate for the Venezuelan economy. In 2008, the 




Given  these  enormous  forecasting  errors,  we  should  not  be  surprised  if  the  IMF  and  other 
projections for the Venezuelan economy turn out to be far off the mark over the next year and well 
into the future. 
 
TABLE 4 
Venezuela’s Projected (by the IMF) and Actual GPD Growth 
Year  Projected Growth  
(from Fall WEO, Previous Year) 
Actual Growth  
for the Year 
Error in Forecast  
(Percentage Points) 
2000  1.6  3.7  -2.1 
2001  3.0  3.4  -0.4 
2002  2.8  -8.9  11.7 
2003  2.2  -7.8  10.0 
2004  7.7  18.3  -10.6 
2005  3.5  10.3  -6.8 
2006  4.5  9.9  -5.8 
2007  3.7  8.2  -4.7 
2008  6.0  4.8  1.2 
2009  2.0  -3.3  5.3 
Source: International Monetary Fund 1999-2010. 
 
                                                 
22 Across all countries, the IMF’s projections for 2009 growth, published in the October 2008 WEO database, were an 
average of 4.7 percentage points higher than the actual growth rates (or later projections) recorded in the 2010 April 
WEO database.  (IMF 1999-2010). CEPR  Update on the Venezuelan Economy  ￿ 12 
 
 
Future Prospects for the Venezuelan Economy 
If the Venezuelan economy is indeed recovering, the question remains whether this recovery will 
accelerate and be sustainable. It appears that this will depend primarily on government policy. 
 
As noted above, there are many arguments that the Venezuelan economy will remain mired in 
recession  or  stagnation,  and/or  is  doomed  to  long  term  decline.  Here  we  will  consider  these 
possibilities and arguments. 
 
One possibility is that the government has created a unfavorable investment climate, and that this 
will severely limit the country’s growth and development. As noted above, private capital formation 
as a percentage of GDP has declined significantly, even before the 2009 recession. This is to be 
expected with the kinds of policy changes that Venezuela has had, since most of the private sector 
has  been  against  most  of  the  policy  changes,  and  against  the  government  in  general.  The 
governments of Bolivia and Ecuador have also faced some of the same hostility from sectors of the 
business community, as have historically most left or left-of-center governments. The question is 
whether this necessarily means that the Venezuelan economy, which grew very rapidly in the last 
expansion  from  2003-2008,  is  likely  to  face  significant  constraints  on  its  future  growth  due  to 
negative investor sentiment.  
 
The answer to this question is most likely no. As can be seen in Figure 3, private capital formation 
rebounded very rapidly as the economic recovery began in 2003, despite intense hostility on the part 
of the most powerful business interests – which had just completed two attempts within one year to 
overthrow the government. This indicates that many domestic investors, when there are profitable 
opportunities to invest within the country, will take advantage of them. Although most business 
people in Venezuela are conservative and against the government, they can also be pragmatic. The 
probability of any investor losing money to expropriation in Venezuela remains very small; it is 
doubtful  that  this  is  a  serious  practical  consideration  for  most  private  investment decisions, as 
compared to the normal risks associated with uncertainty over prices of inputs and output, and 
demand conditions. 
 
The government can also compensate for the current fall-off in private investment by increasing 
public investment. This was done successfully in 2008, as can be seen in Figure 3.  As the recent 
electricity crisis has shown, Venezuela has a great need for public investment in infrastructure. The 
government can also invest in residential construction, transportation, hospitals, and other public 
needs. All of this can compensate for weak private investment, as necessary. And as can be seen in 
Table 2, private consumption follows the growth of the economy. Eventually, if it becomes clear 
that  the  government  is  committed  to  maintaining  economic  growth,  we  would  expect  private 
investment to increase, as it did from 2003-2006.  
 
The government can increase and maintain economic growth so long as it does not face a foreign 
exchange crisis. It is important to understand that this is the binding constraint on countries that do 
not have “hard” currencies (as compared to the U.S., which can pay for its imports in dollars). The 
fiscal deficit is not a binding constraint, since it can be financed with domestic currency.  
 
Venezuela is not in danger of a foreign exchange crisis. Its official reserves at the Central Bank are 
currently at US$28 billion. This is a reasonably high level of reserves, however: approximately half of 
imports for 2008 and over two-thirds for the reduced imports of 2009. (The most widely used CEPR  Update on the Venezuelan Economy  ￿ 13 
 
 
benchmark is that international reserves should be sufficient to cover three months of imports.)
23 
Furthermore, Venezuela probably does not need as much of a reserve cushion than most countries, 
because of its currency controls. 
 
It is believed that the government has other reserves in addition to those at the Central Bank, 
although it is impossible to know exactly how much.
24  Over the past year,
25 Venezuela’s current 
account surplus was US$19.8 billion, or about 6.3 percent of GDP, which is sizeable. 
 
Furthermore, in the case of a collapse of oil prices, the government has considerable borrowing 
capacity. This was demonstrated in April with a $20 billion credit from China.
26  Venezuela’s total 
central government public debt is just 18.4 percent of GDP; and its foreign public debt is 10.8 
percent of GDP.
27 Even if we add in the debt of PDVSA, the state-owned oil company – about 6 
percent  of  GDP  –  this  is  a  low  foreign  and  domestic  public  debt  burden,  which  gives  the 
government plenty of room to borrow if there are unforeseen external shocks. It is worth noting 
that the U.S. Energy Information Administration forecasts oil prices at $85 per barrel over the next 
5 years, which is 20% above the current price.
28 
 
Venezuela’s inflation rate is another often mentioned problem, which is generally reported as “the 
highest in Latin America.”  Figure 3 shows monthly year-over-year inflation at 30.9 percent. This is 
high inflation, although there are no signs that it is accelerating: inflation over the last three months 
is  running at an annualized rate of 26 percent, and core inflation has been declining since last 
September. So long as it does not accelerate, Venezuela’s inflation is not by itself necessarily a 
significant impediment to future economic growth, and can be lowered gradually.
29 It is also worth 
emphasizing that the predicted surge in inflation following the devaluation did not happen – sources 
quoted by the media were in the range of 40-60 percent annual inflation for this year.
30  In fact, the 
26 percent inflation over the last three months is lower than inflation for the three months prior to 
the January devaluation. 
 
The main impact of inflation has been an indirect effect, through its influence on the real exchange 
rate. The nominal exchange rate was fixed at 2.15 from March 2005 until January of 2010. With the 
exchange rate fixed and inflation averaging about 20 percent annually over the last seven years, the 
bolivar appreciated rapidly in real terms.
31 This has made imports increasingly cheap and non-oil 
exports increasingly expensive, in real terms. During the expansion, manufacturing basically held its 
own at about 16 percent of GDP; the fastest growing sectors were non-tradables such as finance 





                                                 
23 See Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001) for a review of the literature on the adequacy of reserves. 
24 See Weisbrot, Ray, and Sandoval (2009, p 23) for more on these reserves. 
25 This Q1 2009 to Q1 2010. 
26 Molinski and Lyons 2010. 
27 Oficinal Nacional de Crédito Público 2010. 
28 United States Energy Information Administration 2010. 
29 See Weisbrot, Ray and Sandoval (2009, p. 19) for more on inflation. 
30 See for example Forero 2010 and Jaramillo 2010.  
31 See Weisbrot, Ray and Sandoval. 















































































Source: Banco Central de Venezuela 2010, Table 4.1.6s. 
Note: Core inflation is here defined by the Banco Central de Venezuela.  It differs from that presented in Weisbrot, 
Ray, and Sandoval (2009), which the authors calculated based on the US definition for international comparison.   
 
In January of 2010, the government devalued the bolivar to 4.3 to the dollar for most imports, 
bringing  it  much  closer  to  a  competitive  level.  At  the  same  time,  a rate of 2.6 per dollar was 
established for sectors deemed essential, which include food, education, science and technology, 
health, machinery and equipment, family remittances and transfers to students living abroad. In June 
2010 the government implemented a new currency market intended to replace the parallel market, 
regulated by the Central Bank; the exchange rate for this market has most recently been about 5.3 
bolivares fuertes to the dollar. 
 
The devaluations have reversed a good part of the real appreciation of the currency over the last 5 
years, but not all of it. If Venezuela wants to diversify its economy away from oil – which it has not 
done over the last decade – it will most likely need a more competitive exchange rate. 
 
Nonetheless, for the narrow question at hand here – whether the Venezuelan economy can resume 
and sustain strong economic growth – the exchange rate is unlikely to be determinative. It will affect 
the  sectoral  mix  of  economic  growth,  tilting  it  toward  non-tradables  as  during  the  previous 
expansion. But the pace of economic growth is more likely to be determined by the government’s 
other macroeconomic policies, most importantly public spending. 
 
Of course it will be better if Venezuela can diversify away from oil sooner rather than later, and 
minimize the inefficiencies associated with controlling its exchange rate and maintaining currency 
controls. And as noted above, because Venezuela’s inflation is much higher than that of its trading CEPR  Update on the Venezuelan Economy  ￿ 15 
 
 
partners, it will continue to cause unwanted real appreciation of the bolivar until inflation is brought 
to lower levels. 
 
But because of Venezuela’s position as an oil exporter – and one sitting on 500 billion barrels of oil, 
perhaps  the  largest  reserves  in  the  world  –  it  is  very  unlikely  to  run  into  foreign  exchange 
constraints. Therefore its growth, especially in the near future, will depend overwhelmingly on the 
government’s commitment to maintaining adequate levels of aggregate demand. (In that respect, its 
immediate situation is similar to that of the United States, the Eurozone economies, and many other 
economies  whose  recovery  is  currently  weak  and  uncertain.)  In  the  immediate  future,  the 
Venezuelan economy’s dependence on oil is not a particular disadvantage, as countries dependent 
on manufacturing exports, for example, are at least as likely to be hard hit by a global slowdown – if 
it happens – as are oil exporters.  
 
If the government maintains adequate levels of aggregate demand – including a commitment to 
strong counter-cyclical policies as necessary – the Venezuelan economy will grow, and the progress 
in employment, living standards, poverty reduction, and income equality that were seen during the 
previous expansion will continue. Of course this is not guaranteed – it depends on whether the 
government is willing to make, and maintain, this commitment to growth. The government will also 
have to make sure that sufficient foreign exchange is made available for imports that are inputs to 
production. If these commitments are met, then economic growth, as well as the accompanying 
social progress, can continue for years, regardless of inefficiencies, development strategies (or lack 
thereof), or other economic problems. This is very different from the situation of many countries 
(e.g. the U.S., UK, Spain) in 2007, for example, where asset bubbles had reached the point that a 
serious collapse in demand was guaranteed, and a severe recession could be predicted – although 
even in these countries, the recession and subsequent long-term unemployment could have been far 
more limited if the proper fiscal policies were implemented. Although there are a number of analysts 
who are predicting that the Venezuelan economy is on the verge of inevitable (and long-anticipated) 
ruin, there is nothing in the recent data – or that of the last decade – to indicate that this is true. 
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